

**Program****Thursday, August 23**1900 **Welcome reception for early arrivals at Tegnér's****Friday, August 24**

Room: EC3:210

Room: EC3:207

0900 **Welcome speech**

0910 A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach Ariel Rubinstein

1010 **Coffee break**

1040	Communication in groups	Chair: Matthias Sutter	Lying and deception	Chair: Toshiji Kawagoe
	Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments – an experimental study	Christina Strassmair	Truth, trust and altruistic punishment: an experiment on institutional selection in sender-receiver games	Ronald Peeters
	An experimental study on communication effects in large groups	Jeanette Brosig	Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling	Marc Vorsatz
	Tax illusion and communication	Jean-Robert Tyran	Pinocchio's pupil: using eyetracking and pupil dilation to understand truth-telling and deception in games	Joseph Tao-yi Wang
	Coordination failure or success? A question of individual or team decision making!	Matthias Sutter	Pokerfaces and lie detection beliefs - an experimental study	Toshiji Kawagoe / Håkan Holm

1200 **Lunch at Finn inn**

1330	Social motivations and communication	Chair: Magnus Johannesson	Promises	Chair: Gary Charness
	How free is your lunch? Evidence from an "Eat-as-you-want-pay-as-you-wish" restaurant	Gerhard Riener	Promises and conventions – an approach to pre-play agreements	Topi Miettinen
	In Your Shoes - A Video Experimental Study on Communication and Quasi-communication in Ultimatum Bargaining with Groups	Heike Henning-Schmidt	Promises matter: On the role of commitment in human cooperation	Christoph Vanberg
	Organisational structure, communication and group ethics	Matthew Ellman	What determines beliefs? An experimental study of promises	Gary Charness
	Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behaviour	Magnus Johannesson		

1450 **Coffee break**

1520	Communication and coordination	Chair: Hans Carlsson	Communication and cooperation	Chair: Ola Andersson
	Organizational structure as the channelling of boundedly rational pre-play communication	Robert Östling	Antitrust enforcement, costly communication, and collusive outcomes: experimental evidence of a novel effect	Sven-Olof Fridolfsson
	Language and coordination games	Pei-yu Lo	Communication strategies in bargaining	Ro'i Zultan
	Are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? A global game analysis	Hans Carlsson	Communication and renegotiation in two-stage games	Ola Andersson

1620 **Break**

1640 Communication in Psychological Games Martin Dufwenberg

1740 **End**1900 **Conference dinner at Grand Hotel****Saturday, August 25**

0900 Noisy Talk Andreas Blume

1000 **Coffee break**

1020	Information disclosure	Chair: Elisabeth Schulte	Cheap talk and information aggregation	Chair: Peter Norman Sørensen
	When mandatory disclosure hurts: expert advice and conflicting interests	Kristóf Madarász	A model of persuasion	Itai Sher
	Robust inference when the evidence structure is unknown	Stephen Miran	Informative cheap talk equilibria as fixed points	Sidarta Gordon
	Communication in committees: who should listen?	Elisabeth Schulte	Aggregation of information and beliefs in prediction markets	Peter Norman Sørensen

1120 **Break**

1130	Trust, truth and honesty	Chair: Håkan Holm
	Trust and truth	Tore Ellingsen
	An experimental study of information mechanisms in the trust game: effects of observation and cheap talk	Nick Feltovich
	Efficiency, communication and honesty	Jörgen Weibull

1230 **Lunch at Finn inn**1400 Let's talk it over: coordination via preplay communication with level-*k* thinking Vincent Crawford1500 **End**