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Tommy
Andersson Monographs 1.
Andersson, T. (2004) "Essays on Nonlinear
Pricing and Welfare", Lund Economic Studies 121, Ph.D. Thesis, Lund
University Publications in international journals 2.
Andersson, T., Erlanson, A. (2013) "Multi-Item Vickrey-English-Dutch Auctions" Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming 3.
Andersson, T., Andersson, C., Talman,
A.J.J. (2013) "Sets in Excess Demand in Simple Ascending Auctions with
Unit-Demand Bidders” Annals of
Operations Research, forthcoming.
4.
Andersson, T.,
Andersson, C., Andersson, O. (2013) "Sealed Bid Auctions versus
Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study” Review of Economic Design 17,
1-16 5.
Andersson, T., Andersson, C., Andersson, F. (2012)
"An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in
Competing Auctions" Economics
Letters 116,
99-102 6.
Andersson, T., Andersson, C. (2012) "Properties
of the DGS Auction Mechanism" Computational
Economics 39,
113-133 7.
Lyttkens, C.H., Westerlund J., Andersson, T. (2012)
"Efficient but Getting Wet Feet: A Not-Entirely-Frivolous Note on the
Side-Effects of Growth-Promoting Institutions" Economics Letters 115, 118-121 8.
Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G., Yang, Z. (2010)
"Constrainedly Fair Job Assignment under
Minimum Wages" Games
and Economic Behavior 64,
428-442 9.
Andersson, T. (2009) "A General
Strategy-Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism Revisited" Economics Bulletin 29, 1719-1724 10. Andersson,
T., Andersson, C. (2009) "Solving House Allocation Problems with Risk-Averse
Agents" Computational
Economics 33,
389-401 11. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008)
"Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to
Positions Revisited" Mathematical
Social Sciences 56,
350-354 12. Andersson,
T. (2008) "Nonlinear Pricing and Equality of Opportunity" Metroeconomica
59,
541-556 13. Andersson,
T. (2008) "Efficiency Properties of Nonlinear Pricing Schedules without
the Single-Crossing Condition" Economics
Letters 99,
364-366 14. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008)
"Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness"
Review of Economic
Design 11,
321-338 15. Andersson,
T. (2007) "Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game" Metroeconomica 58, 503-513 16. Andersson,
T. (2007) "An Algorithm for Identifying Fair and Optimal
Allocations" Economics
Letters 96,
337-342 17. Andersson,
T. (2007) "Nonlinear Taxation and Punishment" International Journal of Economic
Theory 3,
49-58 18. Andersson,
T. (2007) "A Note on Nonlinear Income Taxes and the Utility Possibility
Set" Economics
Bulletin 8,
1-8 19. Andersson,
T. (2005) "Profit Maximizing Nonlinear Pricing" Economics Letters 88, 135-13 Popular Science (in Swedish) 20. Andersson, T., Lyttkens, C. H. (2012) "Ekonomisk
matchningsteori – hjälp vid njurtransplantation" Läkartidningen 50/2012
(The Journal of the Swedish Medical Association),
2276-2277 21. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008) "Effektiva hyror
- En tillämpning av teorin för Mechanism
Design" Ekonomisk
Debatt 2008:1 (The Journal of
the Swedish Economic Association),
47-58 22. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008) "Mechanism Design och bostadsmarknaden - En replik till
Hans Lind" Ekonomisk Debatt 2008:8 (The Journal of the Swedish Economic Association), 60-61 Work in Progress Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions
with Unit-Demand Bidders This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set
of items whose prices are to be updated in ascending auctions with
unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is
introduced, and it is demonstrated that the selections suggested by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Economy 94:
863–872, 1986) and its modification based on the Ford-Fulkerson method
proposed by Sankaran (Math. Soc. Sci. 28: 143–150,
1994) belongs to this family. The paper also specifies an ascending auction
mechanism where prices for items belonging to a set in excess demand is
updated and demonstrates that it converges to the minimum Walrasian
price equilibrium. Coauthors: Christer
Andersson and Dolf Talman Status: Revised and Resubmitted Working Paper
(revised version from June 2012) Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal
Manipulability A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a
number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of
agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption
bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent
to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents).
Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with
non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We
propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to
compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts
for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this
notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation
rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all
budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to
the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed
as indirect egalitarian equivalence). Coauthors: Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Revised and Resubmitted Working Paper
(revised version from January 2013) Non-Manipulable
House Allocation With Rent Control In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are
bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by the government or a local
administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, a
weaker equilibrium concept is suggested. Given the weaker notion, this paper
defines an allocation mechanism, tailored to capture the specific features of
housing markets with rent control, which always selects a
weak price equilibrium. The main results demonstrate the existence of
a weak price equilibrium and that the introduced allocation mechanism is
efficient and non-manipulable for any given price
ceiling. In its two bounding cases, the mechanism reduces to the weak version
of the serial dictatorship mechanism (Svensson,1994)
and the competitive price mechanism (Demange and
Gale, 1985), respectively. In this sense, the housing market with rent
control, investigated in this paper, integrates two of the predominant models
in the two-sided matching literature into a more general framework. Coauthor: Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Revise and resubmit Working Paper
(first version from July 2012) Multi-Item Vickrey-English-Dutch Auctions Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one
item, this paper defines a polynomial multi-item auction that locates the VCG
prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This
auction is called the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction
and it contains the Vickrey-English auction (J.K. Sankaran, Math. Soc. Sci. 28:143-150, 1994) and the Vickrey-Dutch auction (D. Mishra and D. Parkes, Games Econ. Behav.
66:326-347, 2009) as special cases. Several properties of this iterative
auction are provided. It is, for example, demonstrated that the number of iterations
from the starting prices to the VCG prices can be calculated using a measure
based on the Chebyshev metric. By means of
numerical experiments, it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the
bidders' value distributions, the Vickrey-English-Dutch
auction is weakly faster than the Vickrey-English
auction and the Vickrey-Dutch auction in 89 percent
and 99 percent, respectively, of the investigated problems. Coauthor: Albin Erlanson Status: Revised and resubmitted Working Paper
(revised version from January 2013) (Minimal) e-Incentive
Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with
Indivisibilities We consider competitive allocation rules for problems
where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. It is known that in
“large” economies, such rules are almost incentive compatible meaning that
any agent can only profitably gain from manipulation by e. In “small”
economies, we identify under classical preferences the competitive
allocations where any agent can profitably gain from manipulation in monetary
terms at most by e with e being minimal. If preferences are quasi-linear,
then we can find a competitive allocation rule such that for any problem, all
agents can gain by exactly e from manipulation. Coauthors: Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Submitted Working Paper
(first version from April 2012) A Competitive Partnership Formation Process A group of heterogeneous agents may form
partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate
values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split
their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not
exist, no agents have incentives to break up or form new partnerships. This
paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either
finds an equilibrium or exclusively proves the
nonexistence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue
distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the
process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution
and the model are derived. Coauthors: Jens Gudmundsson, Dolf
Talman and Zaifu Yang Status: Submitted Working Paper
(first version from February 2013) |
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Department of Economics School of Economics and Management Lund University |
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