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Tommy
Andersson See research in microeconomics at the Department of Economics, Lund University
Monographs
Publications in international journals
Popular Science
Work in Progress Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm This paper investigates algorithmic properties and overall performance of the multi-item auction algorithm in Demange et al. (1986) or DGS for short. This task is achieved by interpreting DGS as a graph and conducting a large number of computer simulations. The crucial step in DGS is when the auctioneer selects a so-called minimal overdemanded set of items because the specific selection may affect a number of different performance measures such as the number of iterations and the ratio of elicited preferences. Our computational results demonstrate that relatively small auctions rapidly gets complicated and that the termination speed is slow even when an improved version of DGS is considered. Moreover, from a bidder point of view DGS performs well in terms of privacy since bidders need not reveal much information regarding their preferences. Coauthor: Christer Andersson Status: Submitted
Weak Fairness in a Three-Agent Assignment Model This paper studies the problem of allocating three indivisible objects among a group of three agents when monetary transfers are allowed but restricted both from above and below. The concept of a weakly fair allocation is introduced and the existence of a strategy proof allocation rule that selects weakly fair allocations is demonstrated. The analysis also shows that the complexity of the problem increases drastically when more than two types of preferences are permitted. Coauthor: Lars-Gunnar Svensson Staus: Work in progress
Coalitionally Strategy-proof Allocation of Indivisible Objects on Weakly Competitive Markets This paper investigates the problem of allocating a number of indivisible objects among a group of agents when restrictions are imposed on the prices, e.g., due to legislation, binding agreements, collective bargaining etc. Because the set of equilibrium prices may be empty, given such constraints, the concept of equilibrium is weakened. An allocation mechanism with an incorporated rationing method that captures the specific feature "weakly competitive markets" is investigated. A number of properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. Coauthor: Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Work in Progress
Nonlinear Pricing and the Utility Possibility Set We consider nonlinear pricing poicies that are designed by a social welfare maximizer who operates under a non-negative profit requirement. In our two-type economy, we characterize the set of all feasible nonlinear pricing policies and the frontier of the utility possibility set. Our results provide a link between distortion in consumption and individual, as well as, social welfare. Working Paper 2005:19, Department of Economics, Lund University. Status: Work in Progress
Nonlinear Pricing under a Balanced-Budget Requirement: The Two-Type Case An economy consisting of two different types of consumers and one publicly owned natural monopoly is under consideration. The preferences of the consumers are assumed to be linear in money and the demand curves are assumed not to cross. We also suppose that the net utility from consumption is so high that we do not have to consider the individual rationality constraints. Given these assumptions, we completely characterize the set of budget-balanced and Pareto efficient nonlinear pricing schedules. Working Paper 2004:21, Department of Economics, Lund University. Status: Work in Progress
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| Department of Economics School of Economics and Management Lund University | ||||
