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Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Department of Economics

School of Economics and Management, Lund University

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Tommy Andersson

 

Monographs

1.    Andersson, T. (2004) "Essays on Nonlinear Pricing and Welfare", Lund Economic Studies 121, Ph.D. Thesis, Lund University

Publications in international journals

2.    Andersson, T., Erlanson, A. (2013) "Multi-Item Vickrey-English-Dutch Auctions" Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming

3.    Andersson, T., Andersson, C., Talman, A.J.J. (2013) "Sets in Excess Demand in Simple Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders” Annals of Operations Research, forthcoming.

4.    Andersson, T., Andersson, C., Andersson, O. (2013) "Sealed Bid Auctions versus Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study” Review of Economic Design 17, 1-16

5.    Andersson, T., Andersson, C., Andersson, F. (2012) "An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions" Economics Letters 116, 99-102

6.    Andersson, T., Andersson, C. (2012) "Properties of the DGS Auction Mechanism" Computational Economics 39, 113-133

7.    Lyttkens, C.H., Westerlund J., Andersson, T. (2012) "Efficient but Getting Wet Feet: A Not-Entirely-Frivolous Note on the Side-Effects of Growth-Promoting Institutions" Economics Letters 115, 118-121

8.    Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G., Yang, Z. (2010) "Constrainedly Fair Job Assignment under Minimum Wages" Games and Economic Behavior 64, 428-442

9.    Andersson, T. (2009) "A General Strategy-Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism Revisited" Economics Bulletin 29, 1719-1724

10. Andersson, T., Andersson, C. (2009) "Solving House Allocation Problems with Risk-Averse Agents" Computational Economics 33, 389-401

11. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008) "Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited" Mathematical Social Sciences 56, 350-354

12. Andersson, T. (2008) "Nonlinear Pricing and Equality of Opportunity" Metroeconomica 59, 541-556

13. Andersson, T. (2008) "Efficiency Properties of Nonlinear Pricing Schedules without the Single-Crossing Condition" Economics Letters 99, 364-366

14. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008) "Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness" Review of Economic Design 11, 321-338

15. Andersson, T. (2007) "Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game" Metroeconomica 58, 503-513

16. Andersson, T. (2007) "An Algorithm for Identifying Fair and Optimal Allocations" Economics Letters 96, 337-342

17. Andersson, T. (2007) "Nonlinear Taxation and Punishment" International Journal of Economic Theory 3, 49-58

18. Andersson, T. (2007) "A Note on Nonlinear Income Taxes and the Utility Possibility Set" Economics Bulletin 8, 1-8

19. Andersson, T. (2005) "Profit Maximizing Nonlinear Pricing" Economics Letters 88, 135-13

 

Popular Science (in Swedish)

 

20. Andersson, T., Lyttkens, C. H. (2012) "Ekonomisk matchningsteori – hjälp vid njurtransplantation" Läkartidningen 50/2012 (The Journal of the Swedish Medical Association), 2276-2277

21. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008) "Effektiva hyror - En tillämpning av teorin för Mechanism Design" Ekonomisk Debatt 2008:1 (The Journal of the Swedish Economic Association), 47-58

22. Andersson, T., Svensson, L-G. (2008) "Mechanism Design och bostadsmarknaden - En replik till Hans Lind" Ekonomisk Debatt 2008:8 (The Journal of the Swedish Economic Association), 60-61

 

Work in Progress

Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders

This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and it is demonstrated that the selections suggested by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Economy 94: 863–872, 1986) and its modification based on the Ford-Fulkerson method proposed by Sankaran (Math. Soc. Sci. 28: 143–150, 1994) belongs to this family. The paper also specifies an ascending auction mechanism where prices for items belonging to a set in excess demand is updated and demonstrates that it converges to the minimum Walrasian price equilibrium.

Coauthors: Christer Andersson and Dolf Talman

Status: Revised and Resubmitted

Working Paper (revised version from June 2012) 

 

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).

Coauthors: Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Status: Revised and Resubmitted

Working Paper (revised version from January 2013)

 

Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by the government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, a weaker equilibrium concept is suggested. Given the weaker notion, this paper defines an allocation mechanism, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control, which always selects a weak price equilibrium. The main results demonstrate the existence of a weak price equilibrium and that the introduced allocation mechanism is efficient and non-manipulable for any given price ceiling. In its two bounding cases, the mechanism reduces to the weak version of the serial dictatorship mechanism (Svensson,1994) and the competitive price mechanism (Demange and Gale, 1985), respectively. In this sense, the housing market with rent control, investigated in this paper, integrates two of the predominant models in the two-sided matching literature into a more general framework.

Coauthor: Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Status: Revise and resubmit

Working Paper (first version from July 2012)

 

Multi-Item Vickrey-English-Dutch Auctions

Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial multi-item auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction and it contains the Vickrey-English auction (J.K. Sankaran, Math. Soc. Sci. 28:143-150, 1994) and the Vickrey-Dutch auction (D. Mishra and D. Parkes, Games Econ. Behav. 66:326-347, 2009) as special cases. Several properties of this iterative auction are provided. It is, for example, demonstrated that the number of iterations from the starting prices to the VCG prices can be calculated using a measure based on the Chebyshev metric. By means of numerical experiments, it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the bidders' value distributions, the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction is weakly faster than the Vickrey-English auction and the Vickrey-Dutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent, respectively, of the investigated problems.

Coauthor: Albin Erlanson

Status: Revised and resubmitted

Working Paper (revised version from January 2013)

 

(Minimal) e-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities

We consider competitive allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. It is known that in “large” economies, such rules are almost incentive compatible meaning that any agent can only profitably gain from manipulation by e. In “small” economies, we identify under classical preferences the competitive allocations where any agent can profitably gain from manipulation in monetary terms at most by e with e being minimal. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive allocation rule such that for any problem, all agents can gain by exactly e from manipulation.

Coauthors: Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Status: Submitted

Working Paper (first version from April 2012)

 

A Competitive Partnership Formation Process

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively proves the nonexistence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.

Coauthors: Jens Gudmundsson, Dolf Talman and Zaifu Yang

Status: Submitted

Working Paper (first version from February 2013)

 

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Department of Economics  School of Economics and Management   Lund University