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Tommy
Andersson See research in microeconomics at the Department of Economics, Lund University
Monographs
Publications in international journals
Popular Science
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called ”sets in excess demand” is introduced, and it is demonstrated that the selections suggested by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Economy 94: 863–872, 1986) and its modification based on the Ford-Fulkerson method proposed by Sankaran (Math. Soc. Sci. 28: 143–150, 1994) belongs to this family. The paper also specifies an ascending auction mechanism where prices for items belonging to a set in excess demand is updated and demonstrates that it converges to the minimum Walrasian price equilibrium.Coauthors: Christer Andersson and Dolf Talman Status: Submitted CentER Discussion Paper 2010-51
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence). Coauthors: Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Work in progress CIREQ Discussion Paper 18-2010 Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction, which both identifes the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of investigated measures (consistent reporting, e±ciency etc.). In addition, we ¯nd that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency. Coauthors: C. Andersson and O. Andersson Status: Revise and resubmit
Weak Fairness in a Three-Agent Assignment Model This paper studies the problem of allocating three indivisible objects among a group of three agents when monetary transfers are allowed but restricted both from above and below. The concept of a weakly fair allocation is introduced and the existence of a strategy proof allocation rule that selects weakly fair allocations is demonstrated. The analysis also shows that the complexity of the problem increases drastically when more than two types of preferences are permitted. Coauthor: Lars-Gunnar Svensson Staus: Work in progress
Coalitionally Strategy-proof Allocation of Indivisible Objects on Weakly Competitive Markets This paper investigates the problem of allocating a number of indivisible objects among a group of agents when restrictions are imposed on the prices, e.g., due to legislation, binding agreements, collective bargaining etc. Because the set of equilibrium prices may be empty, given such constraints, the concept of equilibrium is weakened. An allocation mechanism with an incorporated rationing method that captures the specific feature "weakly competitive markets" is investigated. A number of properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. Coauthor: Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Work in Progress
Nonlinear Pricing and the Utility Possibility Set We consider nonlinear pricing poicies that are designed by a social welfare maximizer who operates under a non-negative profit requirement. In our two-type economy, we characterize the set of all feasible nonlinear pricing policies and the frontier of the utility possibility set. Our results provide a link between distortion in consumption and individual, as well as, social welfare. Working Paper 2005:19, Department of Economics, Lund University. Status: Work in Progress
Nonlinear Pricing under a Balanced-Budget Requirement: The Two-Type Case An economy consisting of two different types of consumers and one publicly owned natural monopoly is under consideration. The preferences of the consumers are assumed to be linear in money and the demand curves are assumed not to cross. We also suppose that the net utility from consumption is so high that we do not have to consider the individual rationality constraints. Given these assumptions, we completely characterize the set of budget-balanced and Pareto efficient nonlinear pricing schedules. Working Paper 2004:21, Department of Economics, Lund University. Status: Work in Progress
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| Department of Economics School of Economics and Management Lund University | ||||
