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Tommy
Andersson See research in microeconomics at the Department of Economics, Lund University Monographs
Publications in international journals
Popular Science
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with
Unit-Demand Bidders This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set
of items whose prices are to be updated in ascending auctions with
unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called ”sets
in excess demand” is introduced, and it is demonstrated that the selections
suggested by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit.
Economy 94: 863–872, 1986) and its modification based on the Ford-Fulkerson
method proposed by Sankaran (Math. Soc. Sci. 28:
143–150, 1994) belongs to this family. The paper also specifies an ascending
auction mechanism where prices for items belonging to a set in excess demand
is updated and demonstrates that it converges to the minimum Walrasian price equilibrium. Coauthors: Christer
Andersson and Dolf Talman Status: Submitted CentER Discussion Paper 2010-51 Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a
number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of
agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption
bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent
to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents).
Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with
non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We
propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to
compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts
for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this
notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation
rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all
budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to
the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed
as indirect egalitarian equivalence). Coauthors: Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Submitted CIREQ Discussion Paper 18-2010 Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An
Experimental Study This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending
auction, which both identifes the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful
preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium.
Even though these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there
are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in
more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of
the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed
bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of investigated measures
(consistent reporting, e±ciency etc.). In addition,
we ¯nd that the performance of the ascending
auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such
tendency. Coauthors: Christer
Andersson and Ola Andersson Status: Revise and resubmit e-Incentive
Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with
Indivisibilities We consider competitive allocation rules for
problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. It is known that in
“large” economies, such rules are almost incentive compatible meaning that
any agent can only profitably gain from manipulation by e. In “small”
economies, we identify under classical preferences the competitive
allocations where any agent can profitably gain from manipulation in monetary
terms at most by e with e being minimal. If preferences are quasi-linear,
then we can find a competitive allocation rule such that for any problem, all
agents can gain by exactly e from manipulation. Coauthors: Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson Status: Submitted Other
papers (not yet in the working paper series): ·
House Allocation Under Rent Control (with L.-G. Svensson) ·
Vickrey-English-Dutch
Auctions (with A. Erlanson) ·
A Competitive
Partnership Formation Process (with J. Gudmundsson, D. Talman
and Z. Yang) |
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Department of Economics School of Economics and Management Lund University |
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