*’s
indicate compulsory readings that will be covered in class.
*Andersson, F. (2002) “Notes on Dixit’s Incentives and
organizations in the public sector: An interpretative review.” Lund University.
*Dixit, A. (2000). ”Incentives and organizations in the
public sector: An interpretative review.” Manuscript, Princeton University; published
in Journal of Human Resources 37: 696-727.
*Domberger, S. and P.
Jensen (1997). ”Contracting out by
the public sector: Theory, evidence, prospects.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13:67-78.
*Glaeser,
E. and A. Shleifer (2001). ”Not-for-profit
entrepreneurs.” Journal
of Public Economics 81: 99-115.
Hart, O., Shleifer, A. and
Vishny, R. (1997), ”The proper scope of government:
Theory and an application to prisons”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
112: 1127-61.
Holmström, B. and P.
Milgrom (1991). ”Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset
ownership, and job design”, Journal of
Law Economics and Organization 7: 24-52.
Holmström, B. and P.
Milgrom (1994). ”The firm as an incentive system”, American
Economic Review 84: 972-91.
*Hoxby, C. (2002). ”School choice and school
productivity (or, could school choice be a tide that lifts all boats?)” In The
Economic Analysis of School Choice, C. Hoxby, ed. Forthcoming,
Roomkin, M. and B. Weisbrod
(1999). ”Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit
hospitals.” Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization 15:750-81.
*Williamson, O. (1998).
”Public and private bureaucracies: A transaction cost economics perspective.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
15:306-42.
Wilson, J.Q. (1989). Bureaucracy. Basic Books.