*’s indicate compulsory readings that will be covered in class.
*Andersson, F. (2002) “Notes on Dixit’s Incentives and organizations in the public sector: An interpretative review.” Lund University.
*Dixit, A. (2000). ”Incentives and organizations in the public sector: An interpretative review.” Manuscript, Princeton University; published in Journal of Human Resources 37: 696-727.
*Domberger, S. and P. Jensen (1997). ”Contracting out by the public sector: Theory, evidence, prospects.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13:67-78.
*Glaeser, E. and A. Shleifer (2001). ”Not-for-profit entrepreneurs.” Journal of Public Economics 81: 99-115.
Hart, O., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997), ”The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1127-61.
Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1991). ”Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design”, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 7: 24-52.
Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1994). ”The firm as an incentive system”, American Economic Review 84: 972-91.
*Hoxby, C. (2002). ”School choice and school
productivity (or, could school choice be a tide that lifts all boats?)” In The
Economic Analysis of School Choice, C. Hoxby, ed. Forthcoming,
Roomkin, M. and B. Weisbrod (1999). ”Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15:750-81.
*Williamson, O. (1998). ”Public and private bureaucracies: A transaction cost economics perspective.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15:306-42.
Wilson, J.Q. (1989). Bureaucracy. Basic Books.