The research is funded by the Torsten and Ragnar Söderbergs Foundation and the Health Economic Program at the Department of Economics

Current research: Hospital Organization

Publications and Working papers

Thesis Title: Social Insurance, Organization and Hospital Care (defended 9/5 2009) (here)

Organization Theory

"Trilateral Trade and Asset Allocation - extending the Grossman-Hart-Moore model"
Abstract: This paper extends the Grossman-Hart-Moore model to suite a trilateral trade transaction. In this transaction a downstream producer produces the final good using inputs from two different upstream suppliers. Moreover one of the upstream supplier needs an input from the other upstream supplier for its production. The optimal way to organize this transaction depends on the characteristics of assets, human capital and investments. The general finding is that it is more demanding to find a unique Pareto optimal organization in the trilateral model than in the bilateral Grossman-Hart-Moore model. This paper also produces a number of other potentially useful results.
Working Paper revised version (2008-04-09) here

Hospital Organization

“Public Hospitals - Incentives and Organization”
presented at the 6th World Congress on Health Economics, Copenhagen & Lund, 8th - 11th of July, 2007,
and at the Health Economics Study Group Conference in Aberdeen, 27th - 29th of August 2008
Abstract: This paper presents a novel way to analyze the organization of public hospitals by applying the property rights approach to organizations (PRA) to the problem. It is proposed that while PRA is suitable for the analysis of all hospitals it is especially so for public hospitals. The analysis explores issues concerning privatization and integration of public hospital services. The findings are generally supportive of integration as long as the public principal's human capital is essential for the production of hospital care.
Working Paper revised version (2008-05-27) here

Social insurance

“Imperfect Tagging Revisited”
presented at the First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society Amsterdam, March 29 - April 1, 2007
ABSTRACT: Revisiting Parsons' 1996 article about disability insurance with imperfect tagging in a two type-economy -- individuals are either able or disabled. Here Parsons' analysis is extended in several directions. The model is generalized to allow for different utility functions over work status. The analysis extends to three different cases of a two-type economy. Finally Parsons' model is extended to three types: able, partially disabled and disabled - adapting the model to disability insurances allowing for more than two degrees of disability. The results are consistent with Parsons', but a complete ranking of the consumption allocations cannot be achieved in the general case.
Working Paper a slightly revised version (2007-11-16) here