NEK 435
Social Insurance Theory, 5 points, Graduate level
Fall 1999.
Teachers: Lars Söderström (LS), Agneta Kruse (AK), Klas Rikner (KR)
Date |
Subject | Main Texts |
6/9 |
Introduction (LS) | Diamond (1977a), Barr (1992, pp 747-757), Söderström (1992, 1996) |
13/9 |
Pensions: Lifecycle optimisation (AK) | Samuelson (1958, 1975), Hansson & Stuart (1989), Gordon & Varian (1988) |
15/9 |
Pensions: Supply of labour, savings, fertility (AK) | Felderer (1992), Gale (1998), Hu (1979), Samwich (1998) |
22/9 |
Pensions: Fairness, Public choice (LS) | Brunner (1996), Feldstein (1996), Raffelhüschen & Risa (1995), Sjoblom (1985), Verbon (1993) |
27/9 |
Pensions; Insurance markets and adverse selection (LS) | Eckstein et al. (1985), Spence (1978) |
29/9 |
Work injury insurance; health hazards at works (LS) | Diamond (1977b), Gravelle (87), Manning & Marquis (1996) |
4/10 |
Seminar (AK)* | Theme: How may the Pension system become more stable? |
6/10 |
Loss of income and moral hazard (LS) | Baily (1978), Muller & Brammertz (1986), Söderström (1997) |
11/10 |
Sickness insurance (KR) | Brown & Sessions (1996), Rikner (1999) |
13/10 |
Unemployment insurance (AK) | Chiu & Karni (1998), Mavromaros (1987), Oswald (1986) |
20/10 |
Seminar (LS)* | Theme: Ways to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard |
25/10 |
Written exam | MA 9, 14-19 |
*) All participants are expected to write a brief paper (no more than 5 pages) on the announced theme. These papers should be mailed to (or handed over to) the seminar leader at least two days in advance. Papers are graded (0-5p). Marks achieved are credited to final exam.
Social Insurance Theory, Fall 1999
Reading list
Baily, M. N. (1978), Some aspects of optimal
unemployment insurance, J of Publ Econ 10, 379-402
Barr, N. (1992), Economic theory and the welfare state: A survey and interpretation, J
of Economic Literature XXX, 747-757.
Breyer, F. & Graf von der Schulenburg, J. M. (1990), Family ties and social security
in a democracy, Public Choice 67, 155-167.
Brown & Sessions (1996), The economics of absence, Theory and evidence, J of Econ
Surveys
Brunner, J. K. (1996), Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system,
The case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness, J of Publ Econ,
131-146.
Chiu, W. H. & Karni, E. (1998), Endogenous adverse selection and unemployment
Insurance, J of Pol Econ, 806-827.
Diamond, P.A. (1977a), A framework for social security analysis, J of Publ Econ 8,
275-298.
Diamond, P. (1977b), Insurance theoretic aspects of workers' compensation, in Blinder,
A.S. & Friedman, Ph., Natural resources, uncertainty and general equilibrium
systems (Academic Press), 67-90.
Eckstein, Z., Eichenbaum, M. & Peled, D. (1985), Uncertain life-tomes and the welfare
enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security, J of Publ Econ 26,
303-326.
Felderer, B. (1992), Does a public pension system reduce savings rates and birth rates?, J
of Institutional and Theoretical Econ, 314-325.
Feldstein, M. (1996), The missing piece in policy analysis: Social security reform, American
Econ review, Papers and Proceedings, 86: 2, 1-14.
Gale, W. G. (1998), The effects of pensions on household wealth: A revaluation of theory
and evidence, J of Pol Econ, 706-723.
Gordon, R.H. & Varian, H.R (1988), Intergenerational risk sharing, J of Publ Econ,
185-202.
Gravelle, H.S.E. (1987), Accidents, taxes, liability rules and insurance, Geneva papers
on risk and insurance 12, 115-131.
Hansson, I. & Stuart, C. (1989); Social security as trade among living generations, American
Econ review 79, 1182-1195.
Hu, S. G. (1979), Social security, the supply of labour, and capital accumulation, American
Econ review 69, 274-283.
Manning, W.G. & Marquis, S.M (1996), Health insurance: the trade-off between risk
pooling and moral hazard, J of Health Econ 15, 609-639.
Mavromaros, K.G. (1987), Unemployment benefits and unemployment rates revisited, J of
Publ Econ 32, 101-118.
Muller, H.H. & Brammertz, R. (1986), Moral hazard, Geneva Papers on risk and
Insurance 11, 130-144.
Oswald, A.J. (1986), Unemployment insurance and labor contracts under asymmetric
information, Theory and facts. American Econ review 76, 365-377.
Raffelhüschen, B. & Risa, E. (1995), Reforming social security in a small open
economy, European J of Pol Econ 11, 469-485.
Samuelson, P. A. (1958), An exact consumtion-loan model of interest with or without the
social contrivance of money, J of Pol. Econ LXVI, 467-482.
Samuelson, P.A. (1975), Optimal social security in a life-cycle growth model, International
Econ review 16, 539-544.
Samwick, A. A. (1998), New evidence on pensions, social security, and the timing of
retirement, J of Publ Econ, 207-236.
Sjoblom, K. (1985), Voting for social security, Publ Choice 45, 227-240.
Spence, M. (1978), Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets, J of
Publ Econ 10, 427-447.
Söderström, L. (1992), Processes of distribution: An analytical framework (Unpubl.)
Söderström, L. (1996), The idea of social protection, in Sustaining social security
(United Nations), 43-73.
Söderström, L. (1997), Moral hazard in the welfare state, in Giersch, H., Reforming
the welfare state (Springer Verlag), 25-45.
Verbon, H. (1993), Public pensions, The role of public choice and expectations, J of
Population Econ 6:2, 123-135.
Kursen behandlar effekter av socialförsäkringar, både med avseende på allokering och på fördelning. Kursen täcker både livscykelomfördelningar och riskförsäkringar. Livscykelmodeller och överlappande generationsmodeller används huvudsaklingen vid studium av pensionssystem. Vidare studeras arbetslöshetsförsäkring, sjuk- och arbetsskadeförsäkring; beslut under osäkerhet i kombination med förekomsten av asymmetrisk information studeras. Skillnader mellan icke-fonderade och fonderade system behandlas inklusive effekter på sparande och arbetsutbud liksom effekter av demografiska förändringar. I kursen anläggs även ett public choice-perspektiv.
Examination sker i seminarieform genom inlämnade diskussionsunderlag/recensioner (3 st) samt förberedda kommentarer/diskussionsinlägg på en (två?) medstudent(er)s diskussionsunderlag vid varje sem.tillfälle, samt en essä.
Diskussionsunderlaget/recensionen bör hålla sig inom ramen av 2-3 sidor. Tänk särskilt på problemet i den artikel Du behandlar, på metoden (observera vilka antaganden som görs) samt resultatet. Essän - på valfritt område - bör hållas inom 8 - 10 sidor. Ambitionen är att även essäerna ska seminariebehandlas.
Litteratur:
Artikelkompendium.
[Top]
Föreläsningsplan,
Vt 97:
[Top]
Introduktion, bakgrund.
Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987) kap 1, 2, Barr (1992), Becker (1988), Cigno (1992)
Kruse (1997), Söderström (1996)
Pensioner, allmänt.
Samuelson (1958), Cigno (1993), Diamond (1977a), Hansson & Stuart (1989),
Marchand & Pestieau (1991)
Pensioner, sparande, fertilitet, arbetsutbud.
Auerbach & Kotlikoff, kap 10, Feldstein (1974), Felderer (1992), Ståhlberg (1988)
Pensioner, demografi.
Breyer & von der Schulenburg (1990), Boadway, Marchand, & Pestieau, (1992) Bengtsson & Kruse (1995), Bös & von Weizäcker (1989), Cutler, m fl (1990)
Transitionsproblemet
Buchanan (1986), Feldstein (1996), Kruse, Porta & Saraceno (1997),
Peters (1991), Raffelhüschen & Risa (1995)
Arbetslöshetsförsäkring.
Atkinson & Micklewright (1991), Calmfors (1993)
Sjuk- och arbetsskadeförsäkring.
Diamond (1977b), Edgerton, Kruse & Wells (1995), Lantto (1994), Manning &
Marquis (1996), Söderström, Rikner & Turtell (1996)
Public choice aspekter.
Browning (1975), Boadway & Wildasin (1989), Sjoblom (1985), Veall (1986),
Verbon (1993)
Auerbach, A. J. & Kotlikoff, L. J. (1987): Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge Univ Press. Kap 1, 2, 10,
Barr, N. (1992): "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation". Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXX, June, (741-803)
Becker, G.(1988): "Family Economics and Macro Behavior". AER 78, (1-13)
Breyer, F. & Graf von der Schulenburg, J. M. (1990): "Family ties and social security in a democracy". Public Choice, 67: 155-167.
Cigno, A. (1992): "Children and pensions". J of Population Economics, Vol 5, no 3. (175-183)
Cigno, A. (1993): "Intergenerational transfers without altruism. Family, market and state." Europ. J of Pol Econ. no 9, pp 505-518.
Diamond, P.A. (1977a): "A Framework for Social Security Analysis". JPublE, ( 275-298)
Felderer, B. (1992): "Does a Public Pension System Reduce Savings Rates and Birth Rates?"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 148, s 314-325.
Feldstein, M. (1974): "Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation." J of Pol Economy, vol 82, n 5, s 905-926.
Hansson, I. & Stuart, C. (1989): "Social Security as Trade Among Living Generations". AER, Vol. 79 sid.1182-1195
Kruse, A. (1997): "Pension systems and reforms in Sweden". Chapter 6 in Augusztinovics, M.: "Pension systems and reforms", report from EU Phare project.
Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P. (1991): "Public pensions: Choices for the future." Eur. Econ. Rev. 35, 441-453.
Peters, W. (1991): "Public pensions in transition. An optimal policy path." J of Popul. Econ.
Samuelson, P. (1958): "An Exact Consumtion-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money." J of Pol. Economy. Vol LXVI, 467-482.
Ståhlberg, A-C. (1988): "Pensionssystemets inverkan på hushållens sparande. Expertrapport.
Söderström, L. (1996): "The Idea of Social Protection." Working Papers, No 1996:1, Nat.ek.inst, Göteborg.
Atkinson, A.B. & Micklewright, J. (1991): "Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review." Journal of Econ. Lit. Vol XXIX (Dec 1991), s 1679- 1727.
Bengtsson, T. & Kruse, A. (1995): "Demographic Changes and Economic Growth in Pension Systems, with Sweden as an example." Ingår i Gonnot, m.fl.: Social Security, Household and Family Dynamics in Aging Societies. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Boadway, R., Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P. (1992): "Pay-as-you-go social security in a changing environment." Journal of Popul. Economics, s 67-90.
Boadway, R. & Wildasin, D. (1989): "A Median Voter Model of Social Security." Internat. Econ. Review, s307-328.
Browning, E. K. (1975): "Why the Social Insurance Budget is too Large in a Democracy." Econ. Inquiry, vol XIII, s 373-388.
Buchanan, J. (1986): Dismantling the Welfare State", in Explorations in the Theory of Justice, pp. 178-185.
Bös, D. & von Weizsäcker, R. K (1989): "Economic Consequences of an Aging Population". European Econ Review 33, s 345-354.
Calmfors, L. (1993): Arbetslöshetsförsäkringen - hur bör den utformas?" Ekon Debatt, nr 5, s 429-439.
Cutler, D.M., Poterba, J. M., Sheiner, L. M. & Summers, L. H. (1990): "An Aging Society: Opportunity or Challenge?" Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, 1:1990.
Diamond, P. (1977b): "Insurance theoretic aspects of workers' compensation." In Blinder, A.S. & Friedman, Ph. (eds.) Natural resources, uncertainty and general equilibrium systems, Academic Press, pp 67-90.
Edgerton, D., Kruse, A. & Wells, C. (1996): "Besparingsåtgärder på socialförsäkringsområdet. En utvärdering av förändringar i sjukpenningförsäkringen." Stencil, Nat.ekon.inst. Lund
Feldstein, M. (1996): "The Missing Piece in Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform". AER, Papers and Proceedings, Vol 86, no 2, pp 1-14.
Kruse, A., Porta, P L. & Saraceno, P. (1997): "A Note on Transition Problems." Chapt 11 in Augusztinovics, M. "Pension systems and reforms", report from EU Phare project.
Lantto, Kari (1994): "Vad bör göras åt sjukpenningen?" Ekonomisk Debatt, nr 2, 1994.
Manning, W.G. & Marquis, S.M (1996) Health insurance: the trade-off between risk pooling and moral hazard". Jour of Health Econ. 15, pp 609-639.
Raffelhüschen, B. & Risa, E. (1995): Reforming social security an a small open economy." Europ J of Pol Econ., Vol 11, pp 469-485.
Sjoblom, K. (1985): "Voting for social security." Publ Choice 45, s 227-240
Veall, M. R. (1986): "Public Pensions as Optimal Social Contracts". J of Publ Economics 31, s 237-251.
Verbon, H. (1993): "Public Pensions. The role of public choice and expectations. J of Popul Economics vol 6, n2, s123-135
Söderström, L., Rikner, K. & Turtell, K. (1996): "Om förutsättningarna för en privat arbets- skadeförsäkring. Working papers, No 1996:3. Nat.ekon.inst. Göteborg.
[Top]